DCS1N
COE
OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
(OE)
A composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences
that affect the employment of
military forces and bear on
the decisions of the unit
commander. (JP 1-02)
CONTEMPORARY OPERATIONAL
ENVIRONMENT (COE)
The OE that exists in the
world today and is expected
to exist in the clearly
foreseeable future.
DCS1N
THE CSA SPEAKS
"Today, our Nation is at war and we are a
critical part of the joint team— an Army at
war. This is not a new war. Our enemies
have been waging it for some time, and it will
continue for the foreseeable future. As the
President has stated. This is a different kind
of war against a different kind of enemy.* It
is a war we must win, a war for our very way
of life.
"War is both a physical reality and a state
of mind. War is ambiguous, uncertain, and
unfair. When we are at war, we must think
and act differently. We become more flexible
and more adaptable. We must anticipate the
ultimate reality check — combat. We must
CM?”- three-block
"In one moment in tk/WAR service members
will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees—
providing humanitarian assistance. In the next
moment, they will be holding two warring tribes
apart— conducting peacekeeping operations.
Finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-
intensity battle. All on the same day, all within
three city blocks. It will be what we call the
three-block war."
HOW OTHERS PERCEIVE
THE U.S. AND THE WEST
"We made it clear to the world that we will
not let America's new world order work ....
But the Americans are afraid of death. They
are like little mice. If Russia can be
destroyed, the United States can also be
beheaded."
Osama Bin Laden, Interview, 18 March 1997
"War has rules, but those rules are set by
the West ... if you use those rules, then
weak countries have no chance .... We are
a weak country, so do we need to fight
according to your rules? No."
Col Wang Xiangsui, Chinese Air Force, as quoted in the
Washington Post . 9 Aug 1999
COE PREMISES
No peer competitor until 2020 or
beyond.
Nations will continue to field armed
forces.
- Their actions may cause US
intervention.
- Develop diplomatic and military
plans to deal with US intervention.
- Modernize armed forces within
economic constraints.
Non-state actors in any regional conflict.
CRITICAL VARIABLES IN THE COE
Any OE, in the Real World or in the Training
Environment, Can Be Defined in Terms of 11
Critical Variables:
- Physical
environment.
-Technology.
-Information.
- Nature and stability
of the state.
- Sociological
demographics.
-External
organizations.
-National will.
- Regional and global
relationships.
-Time.
-Economics.
- Military capabilities.
DCSIN
PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
9 Terrain and weather.
9 Military forces are optimized
for certain environments.
9 Less complex and open
environments favor the US.
9 Enemies will try to use urban
environments and other
complex terrain to their
advantage.
NATURE AND STABILITY
OF THE STATE
How strong or how shaky.
Where the real strength is.
Who is in charge.
Nature and aims of military
campaign.
Kinds of threats present.
NATURE AND STABILITY
OF THE STATE
Regional power with strong government.
Support by populace.
Pockets of dissidence.
Failing state— ungovernable.
Other than legitimate government.
Outside support.
SOCIOLOGICAL DEMOGRAPHICS
* Cultural, religious, ethnic.
* Extreme devotion to a cause.
* Sympathetic to enemy cause.
* Refugees and displaced
persons.
* Urban environments (cities).
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL
RELATIONSHIPS
AIILilli^e^and coalitions.
f \s.
vjn. r? -
Political, economic, military, or cultural.
Opponents can influence our coalitions
aTJA, [ YtN/v?,
Add to military capability and broaden
scale of military operations.
Unpredictability.
| J
Nonaligned states.
MILITARY CAPABILITIES
The most critical and most complex factor.
Interacts with other variables.
Measured in relative terms.
Conventional against local or regional actors.
Adaptive (asymmetric) approaches against US.
- US as major power (superpower).
- US has overall technological advantage.
- Others use this as a guide to optimizing their
own capabilities and negating ours.
TECHNOLOGY
What nations and others can —
- Develop and Produce.
- Purchase and Import.
Available on the global market.
Eroding US technological
advantage.
INFORMATION
* Information-based society and information technology.
- Computers.
- Other information systems.
- Civilian and military sectors.
* Information warfare.
- Computer warfare.
- Information attack.
- Psychological warfare.
- Deception.
7
IN
INFORMATION (Cont)
Media and global information flow.
- Transparency (access to data).
- Publicize US mistakes and
failures.
- Sway public and political opini<
Situational awareness.
- Home field advantage.
- Commercial systems.
- Human networks.
EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
International humanitarian relief.
- Manmade and natural disasters.
- Disease, hunger, and poverty.
International media.
Transnational corporations.
EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
(Cont)
Growing in influence and power.
Willingness to become involved in crisis
situations.
Stated and hidden interests/objectives.
- Favorable to US and provide assistance.
- Adverse to US or create conflict.
- Make mistakes.
NATIONAL WILL
People, government, and military.
Objectives and duration of a conflict.
Victory often depends on will.
Attack the opponent's national will
and try to preserve your own.
US national will as a vulnerability— a
strategic center of gravity.
TIME
Time drives decision making
and operations.
Opponents see time as being
in their advantage.
- Adjust the nature of the
conflict.
-Prepare for adaptive
operations.
-Dictate the tempo.
-Seize opportunities.
ECONOMICS
"Haves" and "have-nots."
Economic differences can cause conflicts.
Economic vs military superiority.
Ability to buy military technology or to
conduct prolonged operations.
Regional and global economic relationships
can result in military or political
assistance.
CRITICAL VARIABLES IN THE COE
Any OE, in the Real World or in the Training
Environment, Can Be Defined in Terms of 11
Critical Variables
COE PROVIDES A FRAMEWORK
* To understand and analyze the complex and
ever-changing combination of conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect real-
world military operations.
* To ensure that training environments represent
the degree of unpredictability and complexity
present in real-world OEs in a manner that
sufficiently challenges the training audiences.
ACTORS
Nation-states:
* Core
* Transition
* Rogue
* Failed or Failing
Non-state actors:
* Rogue actors: * Third-party actors:
- Insurgent.
- Terrorist.
- Drug-
trafficking.
- Criminal.
- Humanitarian relief
organizations.
- Refugees/IDPs.
- Media.
- Transnational
corporations
- Other civilians on
the battlefield.
ENEMY
The individual, group of
individuals (organized or not
organized), paramilitary or
military force, national
entity, or national alliance
that is in opposition to the
United States, its allies, or
multinational partners. (FM
IN adversary or
opponent.
THREAT
(Potential Adversary)
Any specific foreign nation or
organization with intentions and
military capabilities that
suggest it could become an
adversary or challenge the
national security interests of
the United States or its allies.
(AR 350-2, Opposing Force Program)
COLD WAR OPFOR
Opposing Force (OPFOR)
An organized force created by
and from U.S. army units to
portray a unit of a potential
adversary armed force.
AR 350-2 (1976)
HOW THE WORLD HAS EVOLVED
CNf“- FY 04 TRADOC
COMMAND TRAINING GUIDANCE
"FY 03 saw us making significant strides
in divesting ourselves of Cold War tactics,
techniques, and procedures (TTP) in our
training and education and at our combat
training centers (CTCs), In FY 04, we must
complete that divestment and fully
implement full-spectrum operations in the
contemporary operational environment (COE)
at our CTCs and in our classrooms."
"Make this the year we unequivocally
divest ourselves of Cold War doctrine,
scenarios, threat, opposing force (OPFOR),
and operational environment; and
completely embrace the COE. 11
OPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR)
fhat kind of OPFOR is needed to train for COE
* Military and/or paramilitary
forces.
* Nation-state and/or non-state.
* Challenging and non-cooperative
sparring partner.
* Has strengths and weaknesses.
* Thinks and acts differently.
CONTEMPORARY
OPPOSING FORCE (OPFOR)
A plausible, flexible military
and/or paramilitary force
representing a composite of
varying capabilities of actual
worldwide forces, used in
lieu of a specific threat force,
for training and developing
US forces.
OPFOR IN A BROADER SENSE
* Military Forces
* Paramilitary Forces
* Other Instruments of
Power
- Diplomatic-Political
- Informational
- Economic
* Allied Forces
Affiliated Forces
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
Universal Strategy for All Situations
Against
- All Kinds of Opponents
- Potential Opponents
- Neutral Parties
Target Enemy's Strategic Centers of
Gravity
- Soldiers' and Leaders' Confidence
- Political and Diplomatic Decisions
- Public Opinion
- Interests of Private Institutions
- National Will
-Alliances and Coalitions
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
•ATr Means Available
- Diplomatic Initiatives
- Information Warfare
- Economic Pressure
- Terrorist Attacks
- State-Sponsored
Insurgency
- Direct Action by SPF
- Deep-Strike Precision Fires
- WMD
• Place Noncombatants at
Risk
* No Sanctuary
• Mnf I imifaH fn \A/ai4im
STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK
Peace
4 4 -
Post-War
► ►
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
Against Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity
REGIONAL
US ENTRY
OPERATIONS
4 TRANSITION ^
OPERATIONS
Against
Regional
Opponents the
State
Overmatches
ADAPTIVE
OPERATIONS
Wartime
On l y
Against Extraregional
Opponents that
Overmatch
the State
►
4
FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US
Major power with overall
technological advantage.
Prefer standoff combat.
Depend on high
technology.
Depend on information
dominance.
Conduct predictable
military operations.
FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US
(Cont)
* Unwilling to accept
heavy losses.
* Sensitive to domesti
and world opinion.
* Lack of commitment
over time.
* Lack of cultural
awareness.
FOREIGN VIEWS OF THE US
(Cont).
* Vulnerability of coalitions.
* Vulnerability of force projection.
* Depend on
robust
logistics.
* Rely on
contractor
support.
* Stretched
■ I ■ ^ ^ M
DCSIN
ADAPTIVE PRINCIPLES
FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST EXTRAREGIONAL
POWER
* Control access to the region.
* Change the nature of the con
* Employ operational shieldin
* Control tempo.
* Neutralize technological over
* Cause politically unacceptable casualties.
Allow no sanctuary.
PARAMILITARY AND
NONMILITARY
Paramilitary
Regular
Internal Security Forces
Government
Irregular
Insurgents
Terrorists
Large-Scale Drug and Criminal Organizations
Private Security Organizations
Transnational Corporations
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International Humanitarian Relief Organizations
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Media
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Drug and Criminal Elements
Other Civilians on the Battiefield (COBs)
SUMMARY
Baseline Doctrine for Contemporary
OPFOR
- Applicable to Entire Training Community
- Allows Scenario Writers Flexibility
Total Operational Environment
- All Eleven Variables of the COE
- All Instruments of Power
- Adaptive Use of All Available
Capabilities
- To Fight and Win Against the US
SUMMARY
Less Predictable OPFOR
- Difficult to Template
- Adapts to Different Situations
Flexible, Thinking, Adaptive OPFOR
- Initiative and Judgment
- Lessons Learned
OPFOR Doctrinal Framework
- Will Meet Most Training Requirements
- Will Continue to Evolve
OPFOR
PILLARS OF COE
IMPLESlEi
Jo
^ 0 oal E nvir 0n
"A composite of the
conditions,
circumstances, and
influences that affect
employment of military
forces and bear on the
decisions of the unit
commander." (JP 1-02)
E Variables
DCSIN
COE - THE TRAINING
"CONDITION"
TASK
Mission
Essential
Tasks
(From Army
Universal
Task List)
CONDITION
Contemporary
Operational
Environment
(Live or
Simulated)
STANDARD
Desired
Training
Outcome
s
COE IN THE TRAINING
ENVIRONMENT
COE variables are manifested in scenarios,
curriculum, and POIs in a fashion sufficient to
- Provide realistic conditions and challenges.
- Produce desired training outcomes and leader
development goals.
An OPFOR that—
- Is equipped and organized according to a TRADOC
DCSINT-approved OB.
- Operates according to FM 7-100 doctrinal manuals.
OPFOR FIELD MANUALS
• FM 7-100 OPFOR Doctrinal Framework and
Strategy
• FM 7-100.1 OPFOR Operations
• FM 7-100.2 OPFOR Tactics
• FM 7-100.3 OPFOR: Paramilitary and
Nonmilitary Organizations and
Tactics
•FM 7-100.4 OPFOR Small Unit Tactics
• FM 7-100.5 OPFOR Organization Guide
T ^9-i66.% on AK0
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